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-Nash Equilibria for Major Minor LQG Mean
Field Games with Partial Observations of All
Agents
Dena Firoozi and Peter E. Caines ∗
Abstract
The partially observed major minor LQG and nonlinear mean field game
(PO MM LQG MFG) systems where it is assumed the major agent’s state
is partially observed by each minor agent, and the major agent completely
observes its own state have been analysed in the literature. In this paper,
PO MM LQG MFG problems with general information patterns are studied
where (i) the major agent has partial observations of its own state, and (ii)
each minor agent has partial observations of its own state and the major
agent’s state. The assumption of partial observations by all agents leads to
a new situation involving the recursive estimation by each minor agent of
the major agent’s estimate of its own state. For a general case of indefinite
LQG MFG systems, the existence of -Nash equilibria together with the
individual agents’ control laws yielding the equilibria are established via the
Separation Principle.
1 Introduction
Mean field game theory (MFG) studies the existence of Nash equilibria and
corresponding strategies for generating them for stochastic dynamic games
between large population of agents [1–3]. Basically, the theory exploits
the relationship between the finite and corresponding infinite limit population
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problems to find control solutions with negligible error for the finite population
problem. The key feature of this approach is the solution of both a Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) and a Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equation, or
equivalently a McKean-Vlasov stochastic differential equation, which are linked
by the state distribution of the generic agent, namely the mean field of the system.
MFG theory offers a framework in which each agent interacts with the
aggregate effect of all other agents. In fact, each agent optimizes its individual
cost functional based on local information on its own state and information on the
overall population state, i.e. the mean field. The analysis of this set of problems
originated in [2, 4–6], and independently in [7–9]. In [10, 11] the authors analyse
and solve the completely observed linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) systems case
where there is a major agent (i.e. non-asymptotically vanishing as the population
size goes to infinity) together with a population of minor agents (i.e. individually
asymptotically negligible). The new feature in this case is that the mean field
becomes stochastic but by minor agent state extension the existence of -Nash
equilibria is established together with the individual agents’ control laws that yield
the equilibria [11]. A convex analysis method is utilized in [12] to rederive the
solutions to completely observed major minor (CO MM) LQG MFG systems,
where no assumption is imposed on the evolution of the mean field in advance. A
hybrid optimal control approach to CO MM LQG MFG systems with switching
and stopping strategies is presented in [13, 14].
In the purely minor agent case the mean field is deterministic and this obviates
the need for observations on other agents’ states. This is a separate issue from
that of an agent estimating its own state from partial observations on that state,
see [15]. However, when a system has a major agent whose state is partially
observed the standard MFG procedure for generating a Nash equilibrium needs
to be extended to include estimates of the major agent’s state generated by each
minor agent. In [16–18], partially observed LQG mean field games with major
and minor agents (PO MM LQG MFG) have been investigated and in [19–21], a
nonlinear generalization of this problem is considered. The main results in those
papers are obtained with the assumptions that (i) the major agent’s state is partially
observed by the minor agents and (ii) the major agent has complete observations
of its own state.
The PO MM LQG MFG problems where the major agent partially observes
its own state and every minor agent has complete observations on its own state
and the major agent’s state are addressed in [22]. An initial investigation of the
case where assumption (i) holds and the major agent has also partial observations
on its own state was presented in [23]. The thorough investigation of the subject
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matter together with the complete proofs and illustrative numerical experiments
are reflected in the current paper (see also [24] for the case where all agents
partially observe a common process). The main contributions of the current paper
are summarized in the following points:
• PO MM LQG MFG problems with general information patterns are studied
where (i) the major agent has partial observations of its own state, and (ii)
each minor agent has partial observations of its own state and the major
agent’s state.
• In the theory we present for this new, general case where (i) the major agent
recursively estimates its own state, and (ii) each minor agent recursively
estimates its own state, and the major agent’s estimate of its own state (in
order to estimate the major agent’s feedback control input). In addition,
both the major agent and minor agents generate estimates of the system’s
mean field.
We remark that an infinite regress does not happen here due to the
asymmetric major minor (MM) feature of the MFG problem.
• MFG theory is extended to cover the general case of indefinite LQG MFG
systems which alleviates positive definiteness condition of weight matrices
in linear quadratic cost functionals.
• The existence of -Nash equilibria together with the individual agents’
control laws yielding the equilibria is established; this is achieved in the
PO MM LQG case by an application of the Separation Principle which also
yields computationally tractable solutions while in the nonlinear case is far
more complex (see [19–21]).
• This extension of the situation in [18], where only assumption (ii) holds, is
in particular motivated by optimal execution problems in financial markets
where there exist one institutional trader (interpreted as major agent) and
a large population of high frequency traders (interpreted as minor agents)
who attempt to maximize their own wealth. To obtain the Nash equilibrium
best response trading strategy, each minor agent estimates the major agent’s
inventory and trading rate based on its partial observations of market state
which entails the estimation of the major agent’s self estimates. The reader
is referred to the works [25–28] for more details on financial applications.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces Partially
Observed Major-Minor LQG MFG systems. The estimation and control problems
for PO MM LQG MFG systems are addressed in Section 3. The simulation results
and the concluding remarks are presented in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively.
2 Partially Observed Major-Minor LQG MFG
Systems
A class of major-minor LQG MFG (MM LQG MFG) systems including a large
population ofN stochastic dynamic minor agents with a stochastic dynamic major
agent is considered where the agents are coupled through their cost functionals.
2.1 Dynamics
The dynamics of the major and minor agents in the class of systems under
consideration are, respectively, given by
dx0 = [A0x0 +B0u0]dt+D0dw0, (1)
dxi = [A(θi)xi +B(θi)ui +Gx0]dt+Ddwi, (2)
where t ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N < ∞, θi ∈ Θ, where Θ is a parameter set. Here
xi ∈ Rn, 0 ≤ i ≤ N , are the states, ui ∈ Rm, 0 ≤ i ≤ N , are control inputs,
{wi, 0 ≤ i ≤ N} denote (N + 1) independent standard Wiener processes in Rr
on an underlying probability space (Ω,F , P ) which is sufficiently large that w is
progressively measurable with respect to the filtration Fw , (Fwt ; t ≥ 0) on F ,
and EwiwTi = Σ.
Assumption 1. The initial states {xi(0), 0 ≤ i ≤ N} defined on (Ω,F , P ) are
identically distributed, mutually independent and also independent of Fw∞, with
Exi(0) = 0. Moreover, supiE‖xi(0)‖2 ≤ c < ∞, 0 ≤ i ≤ N < ∞, with c
independent of N .
The matrices A0, B0, D0, G, and D are constant matrices of appropriate
dimensions. From (2), A(.) and B(.) depend on the parameter θ which specifies
the minor agent’s type. Minor agents are given in K distinct types with 1 ≤ K <
∞. The notation Ik is defined as
Ik = {i : θi = k, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
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where the cardinality of Ik is denoted by Nk = |Ik|. Then, piN =
(piN1 , ..., pi
N
K), pi
N
k =
Nk
N
, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, denotes the empirical distribution of the
parameters (θ1, ..., θN) sampled independently of the initial conditions and Wiener
processes of the agents Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The first assumption is as follows.
Assumption 2. There exists pi such that limN→∞piN = pi a.s.
We note that except for clarity the time argument for the stochastic and
deterministic processes throughout the paper may be dropped for the purpose of
notation abbreviation as in (1)-(2).
2.2 Cost Functionals
The individual (finite) large population infinite horizon cost functional for the
major agent A0 is specified by
JN0 (u0, u−0) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{
‖x0 − Φ(x(N))‖2Q0 + ‖u0‖2R0
}
dt, (3)
Φ(.) := H0x
(N) + η0,
where R0 > 0, and the individual (finite) large population infinite horizon cost
functional for a minor agent Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is given by
JNi (ui, u−i) =E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{
‖xi −Ψ(x(N))‖2Q + ‖ui‖2R
}
dt, (4)
Ψ(.) := H1x0 +H2x
(N) + η,
where R > 0. We note that the major agent A0 and minor agents Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
are coupled with each other through the average term x(N) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi in their
cost functionals given by (3)-(4).
2.3 Observation Processes
The major agent’s partial observations y0 is given by
dy0 = L0[x
T
0 , (x
(N))T ]Tdt+R
1
2
v0dv0, (5)
where v0 is a standard Wiener process in R` with E[v0vT0 ] = Rv0 and matrix L0 is
given by
L0 =
[
l10 0`×n
]
, (6)
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with l10 ∈ R`×n. The partial observations for a minor agent Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , of
type k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, is given by
dyi = Lk[x
T
i , x
T
0 , (x
(N))T ]Tdt+R
1
2
v dvi, (7)
where {vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} denotes the set of N independent standard Wiener
processes in R` with E[vivTi ] = Rv, and matrix Lk is given by
Lk =
[
l1k l
2
k 0`×n
]
, (8)
where l1k, l
2
k ∈ R`×n.
Control σ-Fields
The family of partial observation information sets Fy0 is defined to be the
increasing family of σ-fields of partial observations {Fy0,t, t ≥ 0} generated by
the major agent A0’s partial observations (y0(τ), 0 ≤ τ ≤ t) on its own state as
given in (5). The set of control inputs UN,Ly is defined to be the collection of linear
feedback control laws adapted to FN,yt = {
∨N
i=0Fyi }.
Assumption 3. Major Agent σ-Fields and Linear Controls: For the major agent
A0 the set of control inputs UL0,y is defined to be the collection of linear feedback
control laws adapted to the increasing σ-fields of partial observations {Fy0,t, t ≥
0}.
The family of partial observation information sets Fyi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is defined
to be the increasing σ-fields {Fyi,t, t ≥ 0} generated by the minor agentAi’s partial
observations (yi(τ), 0 ≤ τ ≤ t), on its own state and the major agent’s state, as
given in (7).
Assumption 4. Minor Agent σ-Fields and Linear Controls: For each minor agent
Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the set of control inputs ULi,y is defined to be the collection of linear
feedback control laws adapted to the increasing σ-fields of partial observations
{Fyi,t, t ≥ 0}.
3 Estimation and Control Solutions for PO MM
LQG MFG Systems
In this section we present the solution to partially observed (PO) MM LQG MFG
problems where it is assumed that the major agent partially observes its own state,
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and each generic minor agent partially observes its own state and the major agent’s
state. The problem is first solved in the infinite population case which is far
simpler to solve than the finite large population problem. Because the agents
in the infinite population case are decoupled and therefore the problem reduces to
the type of indefinite LQG tracking problem whose solution is given in Theorem
1. Subsequently, the -Nash equilibrium property is established in Theorem 3 for
the system when the infinite population control laws are applied to the finite large
population PO MM LQG MFG system.
The following theorem is a restriction to the constant matrix parameter case of
the general result in [29].
Theorem 1 (Stochastic Indefinite LQ Problem [29]). Let T˘ > 0 be given. For any
(s˘, y˘) ∈ [0, T˘ )× Rn, consider the following linear system
dx˘ =
[
A˘x˘+ B˘u˘+ b˘
]
dt+
[
C˘x˘+ D˘u˘+ σ˘
]
dw˘, (9)
where t ∈ [s˘, T˘ ], x˘(s˘) = y˘ and A˘, B˘, C˘, D˘, b˘, σ˘ are matrix valued functions
of suitable sizes, w˘(.) ∈ Rr is a standard Wiener process. Moreover, Ft =
σ{w˘(τ), 0 ≤ τ ≤ t}, and u˘(.) ∈ U , where U is the set of all Ft-adapted Rm-
valued processes such that E
∫ T
0
‖u(t)‖2dt <∞.
A quadratic cost functional is given by
J(s˘, y˘, u˘(.)) = E
{1
2
∫ T˘
0
[〈P˘ x˘(t), x˘(t)〉+ 〈N˘ x˘(t), u˘(t)〉
+ 〈R˘u˘(t), u˘(t)〉]dt+ 1
2
〈 ˘¯Px˘(T˘ ), x˘(T˘ )〉
}
, (10)
with P˘ , N˘ and R˘ being Sn, Rm×n and Sm-valued functions, respectively, and
G˘ ∈ Sn×n, where Sn denotes symmetric matrix space of size n.
We also denote the set of all Rn-valued continuous functions defined on [s, T ]
by C([s, T ];Rn). Then, let Π˘(.) ∈ C([s˘, T˘ ];Sn) be the solution of the Riccati
equation
˙˘
Π + Π˘A˘+ A˘T Π˘ + C˘T P˘ C˘ + P˘ − (B˘T Π˘ + N˘ + D˘T Π˘C˘)T (R˘ + D˘T Π˘D˘)−1
× (B˘T Π˘ + N˘ + D˘T Π˘C˘) = 0, a.e.t ∈ [s˘, t], Π˘(T˘ ) = ˘¯P, (11)
where R˘ + D˘T Π˘D˘ > 0, a.e. t ∈ [s˘, T˘ ], and s˘(.) ∈ C([s˘, T˘ ];Rn) be the solution
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of the offset equation given by
˙˘s+ [A˘− B˘(R˘ + D˘T Π˘D˘)−1(B˘T P˘ + s˘+ D˘T P˘ C˘)]T s˘+ [C˘ − D˘(R˘ + D˘T Π˘D˘)−1
(B˘T Π˘ + N˘ + D˘T Π˘C˘)]T Π˘σ˘ + Π˘b˘ = 0, a.e. t ∈ [s˘, T˘ ], s˘(T˘ ) = 0.
Let us define Ψ˘ , (R˘ + D˘T Π˘D˘)−1[B˘T Π˘ + N˘ + D˘T Π˘C˘], and ψ˘ , (R˘ +
D˘T Π˘D˘)−1[B˘T s˘+ D˘T Π˘σ˘]. Then the stochastic LQ problem (9)-(10) is solvable at
s˘ with the optimal control u˘◦(.) being in the state feedback form as in
u˘◦(t) = −Ψ˘(t)x˘(t)− ψ˘(t), t ∈ [s˘, T˘ ].

Henceforth we discuss the stochastic optimal control problem for the major
agent, and a generic minor agent.
3.1 Mean Field Evolution
We introduce the empirical state average as
x(Nk) =
1
Nk
Nk∑
j=1
xkj , 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
and write x(N) = [x(N1), x(N2), ..., x(NK)], where the point-wise in time L2 limit
of x(N), if it exists, is called the mean field of the system and is denoted by
x¯ = [x¯1, ..., x¯K ]. We consider for each minor agent Ai of type k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, a
uniform (with respect to i in any subpopulation k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K) feedback control
uki ∈ ULi,y, which is a function of
(i) minor agent’s estimate of its own state, i.e. xˆi|Fyi , E|Fyi xi = E{xi|F
y
i },
(ii) minor agent’s estimate of the major agent’s state, i.e. xˆ0|Fyi , E|Fyi x0 =
E{x0|Fyi },
(iii) minor agent’s estimate of xj, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i, i.e. xˆj|Fyi , E|Fyi xj =
E{xj|Fyi },
(iv) minor agent’s estimate of the major agent’s estimate of its own state, i.e.
(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi , E|Fyi xˆ0|Fy0 = E{xˆ0|Fy0 |F
y
i },
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(v) minor agent’s estimate of the major agent’s estimate of xj, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6=
i, i.e. (xˆj|Fy0 )|Fyi , E|Fyi xˆj|Fy0 = E{xˆj|Fy0 |F
y
i },
(vi) bounded continuous functions of time mk(.) ∈ Cb([0,∞);Rm).
Hence uki is given by
uki = L
k
1xˆ
k
i|Fyi + L
k
2xˆ0|Fyi +
K∑
l=1
Nl∑
j=1
Lk,l3 xˆ
l
j|Fyi + L
k
4(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi
+
K∑
l=1
Nl∑
j=1
Lk,l5 (xˆ
l
j|Fy0 )|F
y
i
+mk, (12)
for matrices Lk1, L
k
2, L
k,l
3 , and L
k
4 of appropriate dimension, which are time
invariant due to the time shift invariance of the infinite horizon performance
function (4) and the dynamics (2), and where Lk,l3 , L
k,l
5 are assumed to depend
upon Nl, and satisfy NlL
k,l
3 → L¯k,l3 , NlLk,l5 → L¯k,l5 as Nl → ∞ for all
k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Substituting (12) in (2) yields
dxi = [Akxi +BkL
k
1xˆ
k
i|Fyi +BkL
k
2xˆ0|Fyi +Bk
K∑
l=1
NlL
k,l
3 xˆ
(Nl)
|Fyi
+BkL
k
4(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi +Bk
K∑
l=1
NlL
k,l
5 (xˆ
(Nl)
|Fy0 )|F
y
i
+Bkmk +Gx0]dt+Ddwi, (13)
Then we take the average over the subpopulation k to obtain
dx(Nk) = [Akx
(Nk) +BkL
k
1
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
xˆki|Fyi +BkL
k
2
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
xˆ0|Fyi
+Bk
K∑
l=1
NlL
k,l
3
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
xˆ
(Nl)
|Fyi
+BkL
k
4
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi
+Bk
K∑
l=1
NlL
k,l
5
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
(xˆ
(Nl)
|Fy0 )|F
y
i
+Bkmk +Gx0]dt+D
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
dwi. (14)
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To compute the average of the estimation terms in (14), we use the state
decomposition
xˆi|Fyi
xˆ0|Fyi
xˆ
(Nl)
|Fyi
(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi
(xˆ
(Nl)
|Fy0 )|F
y
i
 =

xˆi|Fyi − xi
xˆ0|Fyi − x0
xˆ
(Nl)
|Fyi
− x(Nl)
(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi − xˆ0|Fy0
(xˆ
(Nl)
|Fy0 )|F
y
i
− xˆ(Nl)|Fy0
+

xi
x0
x(Nl)
xˆ0|Fy0
xˆ
(Nl)
|Fy0
 , (15)
which we denote equivalently in the compact form
xˆk,ex
i|Fyi
= −x˜k,exi + xk,exi , (16)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Accordingly we rewrite (14) as
dx(Nk) =
[
Akx
(Nk) +BkL
k
1
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
xki +BkL
k
2x0 +Bk
K∑
l=1
NlL
k,l
3 x
(Nl)
+BkL
k
4xˆ0|Fy0 +Bk
K∑
l=1
NlL
k,l
5 xˆ
(Nl)
|Fy0 +Bkmk +Gx0
]
dt
−
[
BkL
k
1
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
(xi − xˆi|Fyi ) +BkLk2
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
(x0 − xˆ0|Fyi )
+Bk
K∑
l=1
NlL
k,l
3
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
(
x(Nl) − xˆ(Nl)|Fyi
)
+BkL
k
4
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
(
xˆ0|Fy0 − (xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi
)
+Bk
K∑
l=1
NlL
k,l
5
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
(
xˆ
(Nl)
|Fy0 − (xˆ
(Nl)
|Fy0 )|F
y
i
)]
dt+D
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
dwi. (17)
From (17) as N → ∞ we obtain the convergence in quadratic mean to the
solution to
dx¯k =
[
(Ak +BkL
k
1)x¯
k + (G+BkL
k
2)x0 +Bk
K∑
l=1
L¯k,l3 x¯
l +BkL
k
4xˆ0|Fy0
+Bk
K∑
l=1
L¯k,l5 ˆ¯x
l
|Fy0 +Bkmk
]
dt−
[
BkL
k
1(xi − xˆi|Fyi )k +BkLk2(x0 − xˆ0|Fyi )k
10
+Bk
K∑
l=1
L¯k,l3
(
x¯l − ˆ¯xl|Fyi
)k
+BkL
k
4
(
xˆ0|Fy0 − (xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi
)k
+Bk
K∑
l=1
L¯k,l5
(
ˆ¯xl|Fy0 − (ˆ¯x
l
|Fy0 )|F
y
i
)k]
dt, (18)
where the overline symbol with superscript k, i.e. (.)
k
denotes the infinite-
population limit of the the average over subpopulation k of the corresponding
terms, which are the components of x˜exi in (16) (see Proposition 3.1 in [18] for the
convergence analysis in quadratic mean).
Subsequently, a compact representation of (18) shall be used as in
dx¯k =
(
(Ak +BkL
k
1)x¯
k + (G+BkL
k
2)x0 +Bk
K∑
l=1
L¯k,l3 x¯
l +BkL
k
4xˆ0|Fy0
+Bk
K∑
l=1
L¯k,l5 ˆ¯x
l
|Fy0 +Bkmk
)
dt+ J¯k ¯˜x
k,exdt, (19)
where we denote by ¯˜xk,ex the average of the estimation errors of the minor agents
of subpopulation k as Nk → ∞, and which satisfies the dynamical equation (65)
in Section 3.4. Hence, the second bracket in (18) is given by J¯k ¯˜xk,ex. (Here the
term J¯k ¯˜xk,ex corrects its omission in [18].)
Therefore the mean field state vector x¯ satisfies
dx¯ = A¯x¯dt+ G¯x0dt+ H¯xˆ0|Fy0 dt+ L¯ˆ¯x|Fy0 dt+ J¯
¯˜xexdt+ m¯dt, (20)
where (¯˜xex)T = [(¯˜x1,ex)T , . . . , (¯˜xK,ex)T ], and the matrices A¯, G¯, H¯ , L¯, J¯ , and m¯
collect the corresponding terms in (19) and have the block matrix form
A¯ =
 A¯1...
A¯K
 , G¯ =
 G¯1...
G¯K
 , H¯ =
 H¯1...
H¯K
 ,
L¯ =
 L¯1...
L¯K
 , m¯ =
 m¯1...
m¯K
 , J¯ =
 J¯1 0. . .
0 J¯K
 . (21)
We note that A¯k, L¯k ∈ Rn×nK , G¯k, H¯k ∈ Rn×n, m¯k ∈ Rn, J¯k ∈
Rn×(3n+2nK), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, are to be solved for using the consistency equations in
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Section 3.4. By abuse of language, the mean value of the system’s Gaussian mean
field given by the state process x¯ = [x¯1, ..., x¯K ] shall also be termed the system’s
mean field.
3.2 Major Agent: Infinite Population
The major agent’s infinite population dynamics, as the number of agents goes
to infinity (N → ∞), remain the same as in (1), while its infinite population
individual cost functional is given by
J∞0 (u0, u−0) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{
‖x0 − φ(x¯)‖2Q0 + ‖u0‖2R0
}
dt, (22)
φ(.) := Hpi0 x¯+ η0, (23)
Hpi0 = pi ⊗H0 , [pi1H0, pi2H0, ..., piKH0], (24)
where x(N) in (3) was replaced by its L2 limit, i.e. the mean field x¯.
To solve the infinite population tracking problem for the major agent, its state
is extended with the mean field process x¯, where this is assumed to exist, i.e.
xex0 = [x0, x¯].
Then the Kalman filter which generates the estimates of the major agent’s state
xˆ0|Fy0 and the mean field ˆ¯x|Fy0 based on its own observations are, respectively,
given by
dxˆ0|Fy0 = A0xˆ0|Fy0 dt+B0uˆ0dt+K
1
0dν0, (25)
dˆ¯x|Fy0 = (G¯+ H¯)xˆ0|Fy0 dt+ (A¯+ L¯)ˆ¯x|Fy0 dt+ m¯dt+K
2
0dν0, (26)
where ˆ˜¯x|Fy0 = 0 is used (see Observation 4). Moreover, m¯ is a deterministic
process according to (19), K10 and K
2
0 are the Kalman filter gains, and ν0 is the
innovation process. Therefore the Kalman filter which generates the estimates of
the major agent’s extended state is given by[
dxˆ0|Fy0
dˆ¯x|Fy0
]
=
[
A0 0n×nK
G¯+ H¯ A¯+ L¯
] [
xˆ0|Fy0
ˆ¯x|Fy0
]
dt
+
[
B0
0nK×m
]
uˆ0dt+
[
0n×1
m¯
]
dt+K0dν0, (27)
with the corresponding Kalman filter gain K0 = [(K10)
T , (K20)
T ]T , and the
innovation process ν0, respectively, given by
K0 = V0LT0R−1v0 , (28)
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dν0 = dy0 − L0
[
xˆT0|Fy0 ,
ˆ¯xT|Fy0
]T
dt, (29)
where L0 =
[
l10 0`×nK
]
, and V0(t) is the solution to the corresponding Riccati
equation (31).
From (1), (20), and (27) we denote
A0 =
[
A0 0n×nK
G¯+ H¯ A¯+ L¯
]
, B0 =
[
B0
0nK×m
]
, M0 =
[
0n×1
m¯
]
,
D0 =
[
D0 0n×rK
0nK×r 0nK×rK
]
, J0 =
[
0n×(3nK+2nK2)
J¯
]
. (30)
Then to guarantee the convergence of the solution to the Riccati equation to a
positive definite asymptotically stabilizing solution, we assume:
Assumption 5. [A0,D0] is stabilizable and [L0,A0] is detectable.
The corresponding Riccati equation is then given by
V˙0 = A0V0 + V0AT0 −K0Rv0KT0 + J0V¯ JT0 +Qw0 , (31)
where Qw0 = D0DT0 , V¯ (t) = E
[
¯˜xex(t)
(
¯˜xex(t)
)T ] satisfies (72), and V (0) =
E
[(
xex0 (0)− (x̂ex0 (0))|Fy0
)(
xex0 (0)− (x̂ex0 (0))|Fy0
)T ].
Then, utilizing the infinite horizon discounted analogy to Theorem 1, it can be
shown (see Theorem 3 in Section 3.4) that the optimal control action for the major
agent’s tracking problem (and hence best response MFG control input) is
uˆ◦0 = −R−10 BT0 [Π0(xˆT0|Fy0 , ˆ¯x
T
|Fy0 )
T + s0], (32)
where Π0 and s0 are the solutions to the Riccati and offset equations given by
ρΠ0 = Π0A0 + AT0 Π0 − Π0B0R−10 BT0 Π0 +Qpi0 , (33)
ρs0 =
ds0
dt
+ (A0 − B0R−10 BT0 Π0)T s0 + Π0M0 − η¯0, (34)
with η¯0 = [In×n,−Hpi0 ]TQ0η0 and Qpi0 = [In×n,−Hpi0 ]TQ0[In×n,−Hpi0 ]. We note
ds0
dt
= 0 in (34), sinceM0, η¯0 are constant.
Finally, the joint dynamics of the major agent’s closed-loop system and its
Kalman filter system are given by
dx0
dx¯
dxˆ0|Fy0
dˆ¯x|Fy0
 = A0

x0
x¯
xˆ0|Fy0
ˆ¯x|Fy0
 dt+J0 ¯˜xexdt+M0dt+D0
 [ dw00nK×1
]
dv0
 , (35)
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where
A0 =
 [ A0 0n×nKG¯ A¯
] [ −B0R−10 BT0 Π0[
H¯ L¯
] ] ,
K0L0 A0 −K0L0 − B0R−10 BT0 Π0
 ,
J0 =
 [ 0n×(3nK+2nK2)J¯
]
0(n+nK)×(3nK+2nK2)
 ,
M0 =
[
M0 − B0R−10 BT0 s0
M0 − B0R−10 BT0 s0
]
, D0 =
[
D0 0(n+nK)×`
0(n+nK)×(r+nK) K0R
1
2
v0
]
.
3.3 Minor Agent: Infinite Population
A generic minor agent’s infinite population dynamics, as the number of agent
goes to infinity (N →∞), remain the same as in (2), while its infinite population
individual cost functional is given as
J∞i (ui, u−i) = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{
‖xi − ψ(x¯)‖2Q + ‖ui‖2R
}
dt, (36)
ψ(.) = H1x0 +H
pi
2 x¯+ η, (37)
Hpi2 = pi ⊗H2 , [pi1H0, pi2H0, ..., piKH0]. (38)
In the case where all agents have partial observations on the major agent’s state,
the joint dynamics of the major agent’s closed-loop system and its Kalman
filtering recursions are employed in order to solve the minor agent’s tracking
problem. Before proceeding we enunciate Proposition 1, where for ease of
exposition, the simple case where it is assumed that the major agent and minor
agents are not coupled with the mean field (neither in their dynamics nor in
their cost functional) is considered. However, each minor agent is assumed to
be coupled with the major agent’s state in their cost functional. The results
are extendable to the more general case described by (1)-(2) and (3)-(4), in a
straightforward way.
Proposition 2. Estimates of Estimates Filter
Let the major agent’s dynamics be given by
dx0 = A0x0dt+Bu0dt+ dw0, (39)
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and the major agent’s observations of its own state by
dy0 = H0x0dt+ dv0, (40)
then the estimates of the major agent’s state based on its own observation is
generated by
dxˆ0|Fy0 = A0xˆ0|Fy0 dt+Buˆ0dt+K0[dy0 −H0xˆ0dt] ,
A0xˆ0|Fy0 dt+Buˆ0dt+K0[H0x0dt+ dv0 −H0xˆ0|Fy0 dt]. (41)
Next, assume the major agent’s control action is of the form
u0 = −Lxˆ0|Fy0 , (42)
then in this case the joint dynamics of the major agent’s closed-loop system and
its Kalman filter system are given by[
dx0
dxˆ0|Fy0
]
=
[
A0 −BL
K0H0 A0 −BL−K0H0
] [
x0
xˆ0|Fy0
]
dt
+
[
0
K0dv0
]
+
[
dw0
0
]
. (43)
Finally, let the minor agent’s partial observations of the major agent’s state be
given by
dyi = Hix0dt+ dvi =
[
Hi 0
] [ x0
xˆ0|Fy0
]
dt+ dvi, (44)
then the process of estimates of the state of (43) based upon the observations (44)
is generated by the filtering scheme[
dxˆ0|Fyi
d(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi
]
=
[
A0 −BL
K0H0 A0 −BL−K0H0
][
xˆ0|Fyi
(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi
]
dt
+Ki
(
dyi −
[
Hi 0
] [ dxˆ0|Fyi
d(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi
]
dt
)
, (45)
where xˆ0|Fyi , E|Fyi x0 = E{x0|F
y
i } denotes the minor agent Ai’s estimate of the
major agent’s state, and
(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi , E|Fyi xˆ0|Fy0 = E{xˆ0|Fy0 |F
y
i },
denotes the minor agent Ai’s estimate of the major agent’s estimate of its own
state. 
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The proof of the Proposition 2 is straightforward and will be omitted, but we
observe that the key property of the overall system which ensures its validity is
that the Wiener processes {w0, v0} are independent of the noise process vi in (45).
Returning to the main problem, the minor agent’s state is next extended to
form xexi , [xi, x0, x¯, xˆ0|Fy0 , ˆ¯x|Fy0 ]. Specifically this yields
dxexi = Akxexi dt+ Bkuidt+ J¯˜xex +Mdt+ D[dwTi , dwT0 , 01×nK , dvT0 ]T , (46)
where
Ak =
[
Ak [ G 0n×(n+2nK) ]
02(n+nK)×n A0
]
, Bk =
[
Bk
02(n+nK)×m
]
,
J =
[
0n×(3nK+2nK2)
J0
]
, M =
[
0n×1
M0
]
,
D =
[
D 0n×(r+nK+`)
02(n+nK)×r D0
]
. (47)
To derive the Kalman filter equations for (46), we first define Lk =[
l1k l
2
k 0`×(n+2nK)
]
. To guarantee the convergence of the solution to the Riccati
equation to a positive definite asymptotically stabilizing solution, we assume:
Assumption 6. The system parameter set Θ = {1, ..., K} is such that [Ak,D] is
stabilizable and [Lk,Ak] is detectable for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
The Riccati equation associated with the filtering equations for (46) is then
given by
V˙k = AkVk + VkATk −KkRvKTk + JV¯ JT +Qw, (48)
where Qw = DDT , V¯ (t) = E
[
¯˜xex(t)
(
¯˜xex(t)
)T ] satisfies (72), and Vk(0) =
E
[(
xexi (0) − (x̂exi (0))|Fyi
)(
xexi (0) − (x̂exi (0))|Fyi
)T ]. The Kalman filter gain Kk
is in turn given by
Kk = VkLTkR−1v , (49)
and the innovation process νi(t) is defined as in
dνi = dyi − Lk
[
xˆTi|Fyi , xˆ
T
0|Fyi ,
ˆ¯xT|Fyi , (xˆ0|F
y
0
)T|Fyi , (
ˆ¯x|Fy0 )
T
|Fyi
]T
dt, (50)
where (xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi and (ˆ¯x|Fy0 )|Fyi , respectively, denote the minor agent Ai’s
estimates of the major agent’s estimates of its own state and the mean field. Then
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the Kalman filter equations for a generic minor agent Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are given
as in
dxˆexi|Fyi = Akxˆ
ex
i|Fyi dt+ Bkuˆidt+Mdt+Kkdνi, (51)
where ˆ˜¯xex|Fyi = 0 (see Observation 4) is used. Clearly, (51) generates the iterated
estimates (xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi and (ˆ¯x|Fy0 )|Fyi which are required to calculate xˆ0|Fyi and ˆ¯x|Fyi
(see Proposition 1 in [30] for a simplified case of Estimates of Estimates Filter).
Remark 1. By virtue of the asymmetric information available to the major agent
and a generic minor agent, an infinite regress does not occur in the process of
estimating other agents’ states. In fact to calculate the best response action, the
major agent only estimates its own state and hence does not estimate minor agents’
states, while each minor agent estimates its own state and the major agent’s state.
We note that by Assumption 3 the minor agent Ai is able to estimate uˆ◦0
whenever the functional dependence of the major agent’s control on it’s state is
available to the minor agent through forming the conditional expectation of the
major agent’s control action which by (32) is given by the following expression
(uˆ◦0)|Fyi = E{uˆ◦0|F
y
i } = −R−1BT0
[
Π0
(
(xˆ0|Fy0 )
T
|Fyi , (
ˆ¯x|Fy0 )
T
|Fyi
)
+ s0
]
, (52)
and which is embedded in (51). Then, utilizing the infinite horizon discounted
analogy to Theorem 1, it can be shown (see Theorem 3) that the optimal control
action for the minor agent Ai’s tracking problem (and hence best response MFG
control input) is given by
uˆ◦i = −R−1BTk
[
Πk
(
xˆTi|Fyi , xˆ
T
0|Fyi ,
ˆ¯xT|Fyi , (xˆ0|F
y
0
)T|Fyi , (
ˆ¯x|Fy0 )
T
|Fyi
)T
+ sk
]
, (53)
where the iterated estimation terms (xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi , and (ˆ¯x|Fy0 )|Fyi explicitly appear,
and the corresponding Riccati and offset equations are given by
ρΠk = ΠkAk + ATkΠk − ΠkBkR−1BTkΠk +Qpi, ∀k, (54)
ρsk =
dsk
dt
+ (Ak − BkR−1BTkΠk)T sk + ΠkM− η¯, ∀k, (55)
with η¯ = [In×n, −H1, −Hpi2 , 0n×(n+nK)]TQη,
and Qpi = [In×n, −H1, −Hpi2 , 0n×(n+nK)]TQ[In×n, −H1, −Hpi2 , 0n×(n+nK)]. We
note dsk
dt
= 0 in (55), sinceM, η¯ are constant.
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3.4 Mean Field Consistency Equations
Let us denote the components of Πk in (54) as
Πk =
[
Πk,11 Πk,12 Πk,13 Πk,14 Πk,15
Πk,21 Πk,22 Πk,23 Πk,24 Πk,25
]
, (56)
1 ≤ k ≤ K, and where Πk,11, Πk,12, Πk,14 ∈ Rn×n, Πk,13, Πk,15 ∈ Rn×nK ,
Πk,21, Πk,22, Πk,24 ∈ R2(n+nK)×n, and Πk,23, Πk,25 ∈ R2(n+nK)×nK . Let us also
define the block matrix ek,v = [0v×v, ..., 0v×v, Iv, 0v×v, ..., 0v×v] with K blocks,
where the v × v identity matrix Iv is located at the kth block. Finally we define
the block matrix 1v = [Iv, ..., Iv, ..., Iv] with K blocks of identity matrix. Then
we denote by
e¯k = ek,n, (57)
e˜k = ek,(3n+2nK), (58)
1˜ = 1(3n+2nK) (59)
To obtain the mean field consistency equations, we substitute (53) in (2) to get
dxi = Akxidt + Gx0dt − BkR−1BTk
[
Πkxˆ
ex
i|Fyi + sk
]
dt + Ddwi. (60)
Then xˆex
i|Fyi can be written as
xˆexi|Fyi = −(x
ex
i − xˆexi|Fyi ) + x
ex
i ,
= −x˜exi + xexi , (61)
where x˜exi denotes the estimation error, and the governing dynamics for 1 ≤ i ≤
N , 1 ≤ k ≤ K, are given by
dx˜k,exi = (Ak −KkLk)x˜k,exi + J¯˜xexdt−KkR
1
2
v dvi + D[dwTi , dwT0 , 01×nK , dvT0 ]T ,
(62)
where (¯˜xex)T = [(¯˜x1,ex)T , . . . , (¯˜xK,ex)T ] satisfies (67).
Next the empirical average of (60), where (61) has been substituted, over the
population of the minor agents of type k is given by
d(
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
xki ) = Ak(
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
xki )dt+Gx0dt
−BkR−1BTk
[
Πk
( 1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
x˜k,exi +
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
xk,exi
)
+ sk
]
dt+D
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
dwi. (63)
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As Nk →∞, the solution to (63) converges, in quadratic mean, to the solution of
dx¯k = Akx¯
kdt+Gx0dt−BkR−1BTk
[
Πk
(
¯˜xk,ex + x¯k,ex
)
+ sk
]
dt, (64)
where x¯k,ex =
[
(x¯k)T , xT0 , x¯
T , xˆT
0|Fy0 ,
ˆ¯xT|Fy0
]T , and from (62) the average of the
estimation error x˜exi over subpopulation k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, as Nk → ∞, i.e. ¯˜xk,ex, is
given by
d¯˜xk,ex = (Ak −KkLk)¯˜xk,ex + J¯˜xex − D[01×r, dwT0 , 01×rK , dvT0 ]T . (65)
Note that in the derivation of (65), we use the property that 1
Nk
∑Nk
i=1w0 = w0 and
1
Nk
∑Nk
i=1 ν0 = ν0, since w0 and ν0 are the common processes shared between all
agents of type k. Moreover, the law of large numbers is used to obtain asNk →∞
1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
Kkdνi
q.m.−−→ 0, 1
Nk
Nk∑
i=1
dwi
q.m.−−→ 0.
Subsequently, from (65), (¯˜xex)T = [(¯˜x1,ex)T , . . . , (¯˜xK,ex)T ] satisfies
d¯˜xex =
 (A1 −K1L1)e˜1 + J...
(AK −KKLK)e˜K + J
 ¯˜xexdt +
 −D...
−D


0r×1
dw0
0rK×1
dv0,
 , (66)
or equivalently in the compact form
d¯˜xex = A˜¯˜xexdt+ D˜[01×r, dwT0 , 01×rK , dvT0 ]T . (67)
Using (56) the mean field equation (64) can be presented as
dx¯k =
([
Ak −BkR−1BTk Πk,11
]
e¯k −BkR−1BTk Πk,13
)
x¯dt
+
(
G−BkR−1BTk Πk,12
)
x0dt−BkR−1BTk Πk,14xˆ0|Fy0 dt
−BkR−1BTk Πk,15 ˆ¯x|Fy0 dt−BkR−1BTkΠk ¯˜xk,exdt−BkR−1BTk skdt. (68)
Since (64) and (20) must be identical, we obtain the Consistency Equations,
determining the components of A¯, G¯, H¯ , L¯, J¯ , and m¯ in (20), given by the
following compact set of equations
A¯k = [Ak −BkR−1BTk Πk,11]e¯k −BkR−1BTk Πk,13, ∀k,
G¯k = G−BkR−1BTk Πk,12, ∀k,
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H¯k = −BkR−1BTk Πk,14, ∀k,
L¯k = −BkR−1BTk Πk,15, ∀k,
J¯k = −BkR−1BTkΠk, ∀k,
m¯k = −BkR−1BTk sk, ∀k, (69)
where Πk and sk satisfy (54) and (55), respectively. The set of equations (69)
together with (33)-(34) and (54)-(55) form a fixed point problem which must be
solved by each individual agent Ai, 0 ≤ i ≤ N , in order to compute the matrices
in the mean field dynamics (20).
Finally from (46) and (64)-(67) the Markovian dynamics of x¯k (i.e. the mean
field of subpopulation k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K) are given by[
dx¯k,ex
d¯˜xex
]
=
[
Ak − BkR−1BTkΠk −BkR−1BTkΠke˜k
0 A˜k
] [
x¯k,ex
¯˜xex
]
dt
+
[
M− BkR−1BTk sk
0
]
dt+
[
D 0
0 D˜
]
0r×1
dw0
0rK×1
dv0
 . (70)
Remark 2. From (65) in the infinite population limit the average of the estimation
errors of the minor agents of type k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, is driven by the major agent’s
Wiener process w0 and the measurement noise v0 (or equivalently innovation
process ν0). In other words, it is driven by the non-zero quadratic variation
processes in the dynamics of the common processes xex0 , xˆ
ex
0|Fy0 , with which the
minor agents Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are coupled.
Subsequently, V¯ (t) = E
[
¯˜xex(t)
(
¯˜xex(t)
)T ] satisfies
˙¯V = A˜V¯ + V¯ A˜T + D˜

0r×r 0
Ir×r
0rK×rK
0 Ir×r
 D˜T , (71)
and if we put D˜ = −1˜TD, we obtain
˙¯V = A˜V¯ + V¯ A˜T + Q˜Q˜T , (72)
where
Q˜Q˜T = 1˜T
 0n×n 0Qw0
0 K0Rv0KT0
 1˜. (73)
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To guarantee the convergence of the solution to the corresponding Lyapunov
equation to a unique, symmetric and positive definite solution, we assume:
Assumption 7. The pair [A˜, Q˜] is controllable.

Remark 3. For the case where the major agent has complete observation on its
own state, and each minor agent has complete observations on their own state and
the major agent’s state we have
¯˜xk,ex(t) = 0, t ≥ 0, (74)
E{x0|Fy0 } = x0, (75)
E{x¯|Fy0 } = x¯, (76)
where (76) holds since the major agent can compute the real value of x¯ by
observing its own state. Hence the mean field equation (20) reduces to that of
completely observed major minor LQG MFG systems (see [10]). 
Remark 4 (Estimate of∞-Population Average Estimation Error). The solution to
(67) is given by
¯˜xex(t) = Φ(t, 0)¯˜xex(0) +
∫ t
0
Φ(t, τ)D˜[01×r, dwT0 , 01×rK , dvT0 ]Tdτ, (77)
where Φ(t, τ) = exp
(
A˜(t − τ)). The initial estimation error of the minor agent
Ai is given by
x˜k,exi (0) =

xˆi|Fyi (0)− xi(0)
xˆ0|Fyi (0)− x0(0)
ˆ¯x|Fy0 (0)− x¯(0)
(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi (0)− xˆ0|Fy0 (0)
(ˆ¯x|Fy0 )|Fyi (0)− ˆ¯x|Fy0 (0)
 =

−xi(0)
−x0(0)
0nK×1
0n×1
0nK×1
 , (78)
since the partial observation information sets Fyi , 0 ≤ i ≤ N , at time t0 = 0 are
null sets, the conditional expectations turn into total expectations which according
to Assumption 1 their value is zero. Hence, the infinite-population limit of the
average initial estimation error of the minor agents of subpopulation k is given by
¯˜xk,ex(0) = [01×n, xT0 (0), 01×nK , 01×n, 01×nK ]
T , (79)
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where Assumption 1 is again used, and hence E[¯˜xk,ex(0)|Fyi ] = 0. Then the
conditional expectation of ¯˜xex(t) with respect to Fyi , 0 ≤ i ≤ N , i.e. ˆ˜¯xex|Fyi (t),
is given by
ˆ˜¯xex|Fyi (t) , E[
¯˜xex(t)|Fyi ] = Φ(t, 0)E[¯˜xex(0)|Fyi ]
+ E
[ ∫ t
0
Φ(t, τ)D˜

0r×1
dw0
0rK×1
dv0
 dτ ∣∣∣Fyi ] = 0, (80)
where the second term is zero due to the independence of {wi, 0 ≤ i ≤ N} and
{vi, 0 ≤ i ≤ N}. 
Next we define
M1 =
 A1 −B1R
−1BT1 Π1,11 0
. . .
0 AK −BKR−1BTKΠK,11
 ,
M2 =
 B1R
−1BT1 Π1,13
...
BKR
−1BTKΠK,13
 , M3 =
 A0 0 0G¯ A¯ 0
G¯ −M2 M1
 ,
L0,H = Q
1/2
0 [I, 0,−Hpi0 ]. (81)
The final set of assumptions is as follows:
Assumption 8. The pair (L0,H ,M3) is observable.
Assumption 9. The pair (La,A0 − (ρ/2)I) is detectable, and for each k, 1 ≤
k ≤ K, the pair (Lb,Ak − (ρ/2)I) is detectable, where La = Q1/20 [I,−Hpi0 ] and
Lb = Q
1/2[I,−H1,−Hpi2 , 0n×(n+nK)]. The pair (A0 − (ρ/2)I,B0) is stabilizable
and (Ak − (ρ/2)I,Bk) is stabilizable for each k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
Assumption 10. There exists a stabilizing solution Π0, s0, Πk, sk, A¯k, G¯k, H¯k,
L¯k, J¯k, m¯k to the major-minor mean field equations (69) in the sense that the
matrices
A0 − B0R−10 BT0 Π0 −
ρ
2
I,
Ak − BkR−1BTkΠk −
ρ
2
I, 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
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are asymptotically stable, and
sup
t≥0,1≤k≤K
e−
ρ
2
t(|s0(t)|+ |sk(t)|+ |m¯k(t)|) <∞.
Theorem 3 (-Nash Equilibria for PO LQG MM-MFG Systems). Subject to
Assumption 1- Assumption 10, the KF-MFG state estimation scheme (27)-(31) and
(48)-(51) together with the MM-MFG equation scheme (69) generate an infinite
family of stochastic control laws Uˆ∞MF , with finite sub-families UˆNMF , {u◦i ; 0 ≤
i < N}, 1 ≤ N <∞, given by (32) and (53), such that
(i) Uˆ∞MF yields a unique Nash equilibrium within the set of linear controls U∞,Ly
such that
J∞i (u
◦
i , u
◦
−i) = inf
ui∈U∞,Ly
J∞i (ui, u
◦
−i);
(ii) All agent systems 0 ≤ i ≤ N , are e− ρ2 t discounted second order stable in
the sense that
sup
t≥0, 0≤i≤N
e−
ρ
2
tE
(
‖xˆi|Fyi ‖
2 + ‖ˆ¯x|Fyi ‖
2
+ ‖(xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi ‖2 + ‖(ˆ¯x|Fy0 )|Fyi ‖2
)
< C,
with C independent of N;
(iii) {UˆNMF ; 1 ≤ N <∞} yields a unique -Nash equilibrium within the class of
linear control laws UN,Ly for all , i.e. for all  > 0, there exists N() such
that for all N ≥ N();
Js,Ni (uˆ
◦
i , uˆ
◦
−i)−  ≤ inf
ui∈UN,Ly
Js,Ni (ui, uˆ
◦
−i) ≤ Js,Ni (uˆ◦i , uˆ◦−i),
where the major agent’s and the generic minor agent’s performance
function Js,Ni (u
◦
i , u
◦
−i), ui ∈ UN,Li,y , 0 ≤ i ≤ N , is given by
JNi (ui, u−i) + EˆN ,
where JNi (ui, u−i) is as in the completely observed case, EˆN > 0, and when
ui = uˆ
◦
i the following limits hold:
• limN→∞ JNi (uˆ◦i , uˆ◦−i) = J∞i (uˆ◦i , uˆ◦−i),
• limN→∞ EˆN =
∫∞
0
e−ρttr[QpiV ]dt,
where V (t) is the solution to (31) for the major agent and the solution
to (48) for a generic minor agent.
23
Proof. Generalizing the standard methodology in [31] and [32], we first
decompose the state processes into their estimates and their estimation errors
orthogonal to the corresponding estimates. Substituting the decomposed
states into the performance functions and applying the smoothing property of
conditional expectations with respect to the increasing filtration families Fyi and
Fy0 to the major and minor cost functionals respectively, we obtain the separated
performance functions. This technique is applied to both finite and infinite
population cases which yields the best response controls {uˆ◦i , 0 ≤ i ≤ N} as
optimal tracking controls for the major and minor agents in the infinite population
case (see [18] for the case where only the minor agent has partial observations on
the major agent’s state). Specifically we form the following decompositions where
the superscript ’s’ on the resulting performance functions indicates the separation
into control dependent and control independent summands.
1. Major Agent’s State Decomposition
Finite Population:[
x0
x(N)
]
=
[
xˆ0|Fy0
xˆ
(N)
|Fy0
]
+
[
x0 − xˆ0|Fy0
x(N) − xˆ(N)|Fy0
]
.
Infinite Population:[
x0
x¯
]
=
[
xˆ0|Fy0
ˆ¯x|Fy0
]
+
[
x0 − xˆ0|Fy0
x¯− ˆ¯x|Fy0
]
.
2. Major Agent’s Cost Functional Separation
Finite Population:
Js,N0 (u0, u−0) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xˆ0|Fy0 −H0xˆ(N)|Fy0 − η0∥∥2Q0 + ‖u0‖2R0}dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥(x0 − xˆ0|Fy0 )−H0(x(N) − xˆ(N)|Fy0 )∥∥2Q0dt
]
. (82)
Infinite Population:
Js,∞0 = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xˆ0|Fy0 −Hpi0 ˆ¯x|Fy0 − η0∥∥2Q0 + ‖u0‖2R0}dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥(x0 − xˆ0|Fy0 )−Hpi0 (x¯− ˆ¯x|Fy0 )∥∥2Q0dt
]
. (83)
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3. Minor Agent’s State Decomposition
Finite Population: xix0
x(N)
 =
 xˆi|Fyixˆ0|Fyi
xˆ
(N)
|Fyi
+
 xi − xˆi|Fyix0 − xˆ0|Fyi
x(N) − xˆ(N)|Fyi
 .
Infinite Population: xix0
x¯
 =
 xˆi|Fyixˆ0|Fyi
ˆ¯x|Fyi
+
 xi − xˆi|Fyix0 − xˆ0|Fyi
x¯− ˆ¯x|Fyi
 .
4. Minor Agent’s Cost Functional Separation
Finite Population:
Js,Ni (ui, u−i) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xˆi|Fyi −H1xˆ0|Fyi
−H2xˆ(N)|Fyi − η
∥∥2
Q
+ ‖ui‖2R
}
dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥(xi − xˆi|Fyi )
−H1(x0 − xˆ0|Fyi )−H2(x(N) − xˆ
(N)
|Fyi
)
∥∥2
Q
dt
]
. (84)
Infinite Population:
Js,∞i = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
{∥∥xˆi|Fyi −H1xˆ0|Fyi
−Hpi2 ˆ¯x|Fyi − η
∥∥2
Q
+ ‖ui‖2R
}
dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
∥∥(xi − xˆi|Fyi )
−H1(x0 − xˆ0|Fyi )−Hpi2 (x¯− ˆ¯x|Fyi )
∥∥2
Q
dt
]
. (85)
As can be seen, the first integral expressions in (82), (83), (84) and (85) depend
on the estimated states generated by the estimation schemes (27) and (51) for the
major agent and minor agents respectively, and the second integral expressions
depend only upon the respective estimation errors and on the solutions to the
associated Riccati equations. The latter expressions are independent of the control
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actions and generate the additional cost EˆN in the finite population case incurred
by the errors in the estimation process.
Next, the resulting infinite population tracking problems are solved for
the major and minor agents in their separated forms. The control dependent
summands in (83) have exactly the same structure in terms of the functional
dependence on the estimated states as the infinite population cost functionals in
the complete observation case have on the states. Moreover, the control dependent
summands in (85) have exactly the same structure in terms of the functional
dependence on the estimated states as the infinite population cost functional for
the system (46) with complete observations on its own state, the major agent’s
state, and the major agent’s estimates of its own state and the mean field. Hence,
by the Separation Principle the infinite population Nash Certainly Equivalence
equilibrium controls are given by {uˆ◦i , 0 ≤ i ≤ N} in the theorem statement.
Finally the infinite population control actions are applied to the finite population
systems and the fact that these yield (i) e−
ρ
2
t second order system stability, and
(ii) -Nash equilibrium property, is established by the standard approximation
analysis parallel to that of completely observed major-minor LQG MFG systems
(see [6], [10]).
Remark 5. We note that (xˆ0|Fy0 )|Fyi and (ˆ¯x|Fy0 )|Fyi do not appear in the minor
agent’s state decomposition and in its separated performance function but that
they are used in the extended estimated state recursion (51) and hence appear in
the control action for a minor agent in (53).
Remark 6. The non-uniqueness of Nash equilibria which may occur in classical
LQG stochastic dynamic games with specified information sets [33, 34] does
not occur in this analysis. This holds since, for the specified maximal
individual information sets, and subject to the hypotheses of Theorem 3 giving
unique solutions to the MFG Consistency equations (as functions of the system
parameters), a unique linear best response function is obtained for each agent with
respect to its stochastic control problem arising from its performance function in
the infinite population limit. We note that any set of controls generating a Nash
equilibrium will yield the same consistency equations whose solution depends
only on the system parameters.
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Figure 1: The Major agent’s true and estimated trajectories.
4 Simulations
Consider a system of 100 minor agents and a single major agent. The system
matrices {Ak, Bk, 1 ≤ k ≤ 100} for the minor agents are uniformly defined as
A ,
[ −0.05 −2
1 0
]
, B ,
[
1
0
]
,
and for the major agent we have
A0 ,
[ −1 −1
1 0
]
, B0 ,
[
1
0
]
.
The parameters used in the simulation are: tfinal = 25 sec, ∆t = 0.01 sec, σw0 =
σwi = 0.009, σv0 = σvi = 0.0003, ρ = 0.9, η0 = η = [0.25, 0.25]
T , Q0 = Q =
I2×2, R0 = R = 1, H0 = H1 = H2 = 0.6 × I2×2, G = 02×2. The true and
estimated state trajectories, and the estimation errors for a single realization can
be displayed for the entire population of 101 agents together, but in figures 1-6
only 10 minor agents are shown for the sake of clarity.
27
Figure 2: 10 Minor agents’ true and estimated trajectories.
Figure 3: The mean field true and estimated trajectories.
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Figure 4: The estimation errors of the major agent’s trajectory.
Figure 5: The estimation errors of the mean field trajectory.
29
Figure 6: The estimation errors of 10 minor agents’ trajectories.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, PO MM LQG MFG problems with general information patterns
are studied where (i) the major agent has partial observations on its own state,
and (ii) each minor agent has partial observations on its own state and the
major agent’s state. For the general case of indefinite LQG MFG systems, the
existence of -Nash equilibria together with the individual agents’ control laws
generating them are established via the Separation Principle. The assumption of
partial observations for all agents leads to a new situation involving the recursive
estimation by each minor agent of the major agent’s estimate of its own state.
To the best of our knowledge, the dynamic game theoretic equilibrium which is
established in this paper constitutes a rare case wherein agents explicitly generate
estimates of another agent’s beliefs. Moreover, this does not give rise to an infinite
regress due to the information asymmetry of the major and minor agents.
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